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A STRONG RELATIONSHIP has long existed between Newfoundland and the exercise
of sea power in the North Atlantic.
1
The European fisheries that sprang up so
quickly in the sixteenth century were highly prized, not just for the wealth they gen-
erated through employment and commerce, but also because of the belief that the
thousands of landsmen who were recruited in Europe to fish in Newfoundland were
transformed by their experience into accomplished mariners. Since most of the
fishermen returned home at the end of the fishing season, they became a reserve of
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sailors from which the state believed it could draw whenever the threat of war made
it necessary to mobilize and expand the navy with decisive speed and effect — or so
it was assumed. Whether the fishery ever did function in this way as a “nursery for
seamen” is moot. Yet commercial interests endorsed the idea enthusiastically, the
better to convince government into providing measures to safeguard their invest-
ments, and countries like England and France fully embraced the idea in their com-
petition to dominate Atlantic sea lanes in war and peace.
The “nursery for seamen” diminished in importance after 1815, as the frequent
wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries gave way to nearly a century of
peace, and navies not only reduced their appetite for sailors but discovered that the
technological shift from sail to steam introduced a need for sailors with very differ-
ent skill sets. France had lost much of its Atlantic empire by then, and even England
was scaling back its imperial obligations by the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Nevertheless, as both of the books reviewed here demonstrate, the naval di-
mension of Newfoundland history remained significant into the twentieth century,
thanks to new priorities and new kinds of threats. Mark Hunter’s focus is on the
Newfoundland branch of the Royal Naval Reserve, established in 1900, terminated
by 1926, and therefore providing service for the Royal Navy during the First World
War. Bill Rompkey’s focus is on the crucial service that Newfoundland provided
for the Allies during the Second World War, giving particular attention to “the ef-
fect of the Battle of the Atlantic on St. John’s and the effect of St. John’s ... on the
Battle of the Atlantic” (50). Each author in his own way is successful in reminding
us that Newfoundland’s wartime history in the twentieth century was not limited to
the fighting on land by its military forces during the world wars and since. While
there is little doubt, as Hunter concedes, that the events at Beaumont Hamel were as
much part of a “nation-building” experience for Newfoundland as Vimy Ridge was
for Canada, nevertheless the Newfoundland naval experience has been cast into
something of a shadow, a situation that both authors in their own way try to cor-
rect.
Of the two books, Hunter’s is by far the more scholarly effort, complete with
reference notes, an extensive (though by no means complete) bibliography, and an
analytical approach throughout. He maintains that the two parties most anxious to
develop a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve in Newfoundland — the colony’s
leaders in St. John’s and the imperial interests in London — each wanted very dif-
ferent things, and that the tension that ensued from this fact contributed to the
mixed results and eventual demise of the reserve in Newfoundland. Colonial offi-
cials believed that the reserve would benefit a society burdened by poverty, lack of
opportunities, and unemployment; they believed that the reserve would employ
men during times of the year when they were not employed fishing. In this, colonial
leaders revealed a failure to appreciate the complexity of their own society. While
few men were fully employed, most relied on a variety of activities — fishing, seal-
ing, working at home in the winter — which discouraged the months of training and
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commitment that the navy required of reservists. To outport fishermen, the reserve
was just another economic activity (76); occupational pluralism collided with the
demands of reserve service. This was something that the Admiralty had feared from
the start; they wanted a reserve that was militarily useful, not one created for patron-
age or other political purposes.
Hunter also shows that the British Treasury and the Admiralty did not always
see eye to eye, Treasury being driven by fiscal concerns, the Admiralty by strategic
ones. The reserve did eventually make some real contributions to the Royal Navy’s
efforts during the First World War — contributions which Hunter examines in
some detail — yet it never generated the numbers of trained recruits that the Admi-
ralty had expected. Indeed, the wartime experience seemed to suggest that the
Royal Navy’s needs were better served through more traditional recruiting meth-
ods than by means of the reserve. The real contribution made by Newfoundlanders
to the war at sea was not in the dreadnoughts, battle cruisers, and other warships of
the modern navy but in small-boat operations and handling as the British
endeavoured to blockade Germany. Reserve training was not needed for this;
Newfoundlanders already had these skills. In the end, the Admiralty did not regard
the reserve as sufficiently beneficial to keep it alive in an ailing post-war economy.
Overall, this is a fairly straightforward interpretation. However, the text suf-
fers from too many repetitions and the analysis leaps over chronological gaps,
which a good edit by the publisher should have caught. The clarity of the analysis is
also impaired by a sometimes superficial treatment of both the Newfoundland and
the imperial contexts. For instance, though Hunter emphasizes that Newfound-
land’s economic condition in the 1890s was critical in arousing colonial interest in
establishing a branch of the Naval Reserve, opportunities are missed to show just
how serious that economic condition had become — there is no reference, for in-
stance, to the bank crash earlier that decade. Similarly, while Hunter does discuss
the imperial government’s desire to have the dominions assume a greater share of
the Royal Navy’s responsibility for imperial defence, including Colonial Secretary
Joseph Chamberlain’s efforts at the 1902 Imperial Conference, there is no refer-
ence to Chamberlain’s “weary Titan” speech at that conference, in which he in-
sisted that England was nearing the limits of its resources to provide for the defence
of the Empire and needed the assistance of the Empire. It was a speech which would
greatly have strengthened Hunter’s analysis. Better use of the available literature
would have made Hunter’s analysis of the strains between what Newfoundland
hoped to get out of the reserve (a shot in the arm for the colonial economy) and what
England hoped to get out of the reserve (greater support from the Empire for the ef-
fectiveness of the Royal Navy) more effective.
There was no reserve branch in Newfoundland during the next world war. In-
stead, Newfoundlanders served at sea in the Royal and Canadian navies or in the
merchant marine by joining as individuals, not through an organization like the Na-
val Reserve. Yet this did not lessen Newfoundland’s importance in the naval war
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effort. Geography gave Newfoundland great strategic importance in the struggle by
the Allies to maintain the flow of food, war supplies, and personnel to England in
the face of the German U-boat threat. The convoys that crossed the Atlantic did not
originate in Newfoundland, but the escorts that tried to protect them used St. John’s
as an operational centre. Newfoundland became a place where corvettes and de-
stroyers replenished, recovered, repaired, and then resumed their dangerous task.
Bill Rompkey sets out to tell this story anecdotally rather than analytically. He
sets the stage with a 50-page introductory essay about Newfoundland during the
Second World War, based on his own memories and research. He then offers a se-
lection of excerpts from the writings of a dozen or so authors, which total another
200 pages or so. Their recollections about the Battle of the Atlantic and the part
played by St. John’s in that longest campaign of the war are used to give readers the
“flavour” of what life was like for those who lived in, served in, or just found brief
refuge in St. John’s from the horrors and stress of the “North Atlantic Run”. This
can be a very effective approach. For instance, his own observations about the criti-
cal role played by St. John’s in the resupply of escort vessels are effectively con-
firmed by excerpts from “The Little Ships that Saved the Day,” an essay written in
1944 by journalist Leslie Roberts, and from The Corvette Navy by James Lamb;
both stressed how officers from the shore establishment would scramble on board
corvettes just in from the sea to determine what supplies were needed, almost be-
fore the corvette had finished tying up at the wharf (54, 65). Similarly, both Roberts
and Lamb contrasted the British base in St. John’s (but run by the Canadians), cob-
bled together from whatever could be scrounged (“all improvisation and make-do;
more a state of mind than actual substance”; Lamb, 65), with the near-luxury facili-
ties that the Americans built at Argentia, again echoing points made in Rompkey’s
introduction.
Some of the excerpts focus on the people of the city. That from Helen Porter’s
Beyond the Bridge succeeds in conveying what life was like for a young teenage
girl growing up in wartime St. John’s, while Otto Tucker’s light-hearted account
of his experiences reminds us that life was not always grim during the war. Yet too
often, the realities of the life-and-death struggle being played out just over the
horizon were inescapable, as when survivors and victims of a torpedo attack were
brought into port for medical attention or burial, or when over a hundred people
died or were terribly injured in the fire that destroyed the crowded Knights of Co-
lumbus hostel in December 1942, or when U-513 sank the ore carriers Saganaga
and Lord Strathcona at Bell Island a few months before.
Rompkey’s intention is to convey to his readers what life was like in St. John’s
during the war for residents and sailors alike. In this, I think he succeeds. Yet a his-
tory of the part played by St. John’s — indeed, all of Newfoundland — in the Battle
of the Atlantic remains to be written. Can the economic impact of the war be mea-
sured? What about the darker side of the encounter between civilians and service
personnel? Rompkey’s book hints at the existence of prostitution and venereal dis-
118 Janzen
ease, but generally such issues are not explored. How did the impact of the war on
St. John’s affect its relationship with the rest of Newfoundland? What effect did
Commission of Government have on the way in which Newfoundland responded to
the war? The literature about Newfoundland shortly before, during, and immedi-
ately after the Second World War is substantial and growing, and a thorough treat-
ment of Bill Rompkey’s topic needs to make use of it.
In the end, both books left me with the same feeling — each in its own way
explored an important topic in Newfoundland history, yet neither dealt with those
topics as thoroughly as is possible. The final words remain to be written.
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Note
1
Throughout this review, I use the term “Newfoundland” rather than the modern name
“Newfoundland and Labrador”. Both books focus their attention primarily on the island of
Newfoundland, and the contemporary name for the Canadian province did not exist during
the period covered by the books reviewed here.
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